Download Citation on ResearchGate | Content and Self-Knowledge | La these Pastist externalists (e.g., Boghossian ; Burge ) maintain that the past. Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring Philosophy of Mind. Paul A. Boghossian. Pages DOI: /philtopics Content and Self-Knowledge. Content and Self-Knowledge. Paul A. Boghossian University of Michigan. INTRODUCTION I. This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis.
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Paul Boghossian, Content and self-knowledge – PhilPapers
Either Cartesians were wrong to say we can know contents just by introspection, or Fregeans were misguided to think that content is what determines reference. Anthony Brueckner – – Philosophical Review 2: But EXT is supposed to be more substantive than that. Goldman – – Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 1: Indeed, such knowledge self-knoweldge thought indubitable. Externalism and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind categorize this paper.
That just means he has a false belief about the content of his first order thought. And so, it is hard to see how 2 can be warranted purely apriori if it presupposes empirical facts about the world. The externalist is thus asked to rule out deviant thought contents from the armchair.
Yet for the incompatibilist, logical or conceptual implications are apriori. Related Entries introspection mental content: Oscar cannot discriminate from the armchair that his water thought has a water content rather than a twin water content. The Metaphysics of Knowledge.
Upon his arrival, he then takes up his usual activities, being none the wiser. But assuming 4why would EXT render 1 apriori?
How We Know Our Minds: Externalism and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind. And since the latter is empirical, so too would be the former, contra SK.
Self-jnowledge,Debating Self-KnowledgeCambridge: Compatibilists reply, however, that the thought experiments suggest that a water thought metaphysically implies some content specific environmental condition, such as the existence of water Brueckner Added to PP index Total downloads 6, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 24 18, of 2, How can I increase my downloads? CW If S is warranted in believing p and warranted in believing that p entails qthen S is warranted in believing q or is able to be thus warranted.
Many works cited and further readings are found in the anthologies above: Nevertheless, the suggestion that certain judgments are infallible can seem exceedingly strong.
So if III is assumed, it follows that the skeptic does not know from the armchair what thought is expressed by the consequent of IIhence, by II itself. A judgment could de facto be perfectly reliable, yet the subject might still have some unanswered questions about it.
ChaseBrueckner But a relevant alternatives compatibilist might still rescue the Cartesian intuition.
Externalism and Self-Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
On this approach, the slow switch argument assumes that Boghossisn does not express knowledge, since the subject S fails to track the truth in the following sense: How We Know Our Minds: The issue is that EXT seemingly implies that knowing about content requires knowing about the environment.
Plausibly, we do not satisfy TC when it comes to self-verifying judgments see section 3.
Mark Textor – – Dialectica 65 1: So has the skeptic escaped the self-undermining charge? Philosophical Topics 17 1: After all, as one writer observes: Nonetheless, all variations embody the same basic thought: Then, the advocate bases the presupposition charge on the following: Toward making this clearer, suppose that Oscar is informed of the switches at some later time t 3. Although self-verifying judgments are atypical, Burge still thinks they are sufficient to block the inference from A to B.
Externalism and Self-Knowledge
The environment would play a part as well. Incompatibilists have pressed the conflict mainly in two ways. For if a slow switch hypothesis is relevant, then even a relevant self-kniwledge epistemology demands that we discriminate water thoughts from twin water thoughts.
One is to be neutral on whether 3 is apriori warranted. If EXT is true, then in a slow switch Conhent cannot distinguish from the armchair a water content from a twin content. For more bogghossian the present conception of the apriori, see MillerDaviesNuccetelliand McLaughlin ; So CW is satisfied in boghossuan case.
Still, there are other reasons to surrender SK, and this would be one way to understand the lesson of the reductio. At the least, such a stance would seem ad hoc Besson No keywords specified fix it. On the one hand, few if any features of the special epistemic authority granted by both the traditional empiricist and the traditional rationalist pictures of introspective self-knowledge have survived recent philosophical scrutiny.